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Abstract
In this paper, we study contention resolution protocols from a game-theoretic perspective. We
focus on acknowledgment-based protocols, where a user gets feedback from the channel only when
she attempts transmission. In this case she will learn whether her transmission was successful or
not. Users that do not transmit will not receive any feedback. We are interested in equilibrium
protocols, where no player has an incentive to deviate.
The limited feedback makes the design of equilibrium protocols a hard task as best response
policies usually have to be modeled as Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes, which
are hard to analyze. Nevertheless, we show how to circumvent this for the case of two players and
present an equilibrium protocol. For many players, we give impossibility results for a large class
of acknowledgment-based protocols, namely age-based and backoff protocols with finite expected
finishing time. Finally, we provide an age-based equilibrium protocol, which has infinite expected
finishing time, but every player finishes in linear time with high probability.
Keywords and phrases contention resolution, acknowledgment-based protocols, game theory
1 Introduction
Contention resolution in multiple access channels is one of the most fundamental problems
in networking. In a multiple access channel (or broadcast channel) multiple users want to
communicate with each other by sending messages into the channel. The channel is not
centrally controlled, so two or more users can transmit their messages at the same time. If
this happens then the messages collide and the transmission is unsuccessful. Contention
resolution protocols specify how to resolve such conflicts, while simultaneously optimizing
some performance measure, like channel utilization or average throughput.
In this paper we follow the standard assumption that time is divided into discrete time
slots, messages are broken up into fixed sized packets, and one packet fits exactly into one
time slot. Moreover, we consider one of the simplest possible scenarios where there are n
users, each of them having a single packet that needs to be transmitted through the channel.
When exactly one user attempts transmission in a given slot, the transmission is successful.
However, if more than one users attempt transmission in the same slot, a collision occurs,
their transmission fails and they need to retransmit their packages in later time slots.
Under centralized control of the users, avoiding collisions would be simple: exactly one
user would transmit at each time step, alternating in a round-robin fashion. The complexity
of the problem stems from the fact that there is no centralized control and therefore channel
access has to be managed by a distributed protocol. There is a large body of literature that
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2 Strategic Contention Resolution with Limited Feedback
studies efficient distributed contention resolution protocols (see Section 1.2). However, these
protocols work under the assumption that users will obediently follow the algorithm. In this
paper we follow [9] by dropping this assumption. We model the situation as a non-cooperative
stochastic game, where each user acts as a selfish player and tries to minimize the expected
time before she transmits successfully. Therefore a player will only obey a protocol if it is in
her best interest, given the other players stick to the protocol.
Fiat, Mansour, and Nadav [9] designed an incentive-compatible transmission protocol
which guarantees that (with high probability) all players will transmit successfully in time
linear in n. Their protocol works for a very simple channel feedback structure, where each
player receives feedback of the form 0/1/2+ after each time step (ternary feedback), indicating
whether zero, one, or more than one transmission was attempted. Christodoulou, Ligett and
Pyrga [8] designed equilibrium protocols for multiplicity feedback, where each player receives
as feedback the number of players that attempted transmission1.
The above protocols fall in the class of full-sensing protocols [13] where the channel
feedback is broadcasted to all sources. However, in wireless channels, there are situations
where full-sensing is not possible because of the hidden-terminal problem [27]. In this paper,
we focus on acknowledgment-based protocols, which use a more limited feedback model – the
only feedback that a user gets is whether her transmission was successful or not. A user
that does not transmit cannot “listen” to channel and therefore does not get any feedback.
In other words, the only information that a user has is the history of her own transmission
attempts. Acknowledgment-based protocols have been extensively studied in the literature
(see e.g. [13] and references therein). Age-based and backoff protocols both belong to the
class of acknowledgment-based protocols.
Age-based protocols can be described by a sequence of probabilities (one for each time-
step) of transmitting in each time step. Those probabilities are given beforehand and do not
change based on the transmission history. The well known ALOHA protocol [1] is a special
age-based protocol, where – except for the first round – users always transmit with the same
probability. In contrast, in backoff protocols, the probability of transmitting in the next
time step only depends on the number of unsuccessful transmissions for the user. Here, a
popular representative is the binary exponential backoff mechanism, which is also used by
the Ethernet protocol [20].
The design and the limitations of acknowledgment-based protocols is well-understood
[10, 18] if the users are not strategic. In this paper, we focus on the game-theoretic aspect of
those protocols.
1.1 Our Results
We study the design of acknowledgment-based equilibrium protocols. A user gets feedback
only when she attempts transmission, in which case she either receives an acknowledgment,
in case of success, or she realizes that a collision occurred (by the lack of an acknowledgment).
This model allows for very limited feedback, as opposed to full-sensing protocols studied
in [9, 8] where all players, even those who did not attempt transmission receive channel
feedback.
The feedback models used in [9, 8] allow players, at each given time, to know exactly the
number of pending players. This information is very useful for the design of equilibrium
protocols. In our case, we assume that the number of pending players is common knowledge
1 They also assume non-zero transmission costs, as opposed to [9] and to this work.
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only at the beginning. If a player chooses not to transmit during a time-slot, then she is
not sure how many players are still in the game. From this time on, she can only sense the
existence of other pending players when she participates in a collision.
The analysis of acknowledgment-based equilibrium protocols requires different techniques.
In full-sensing protocols, a best response for a source can be modeled as an optimal policy of
a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [9]. For an acknowledgment-based protocol, this is in
general no longer possible, due to the uncertainty imposed by a non-transmission. However,
the best response policy in this case can be modeled as a Partially Observable Markov
Decision Processes (POMDP), which are more complicated to analyze.
Lack of information makes the design of equilibrium protocols a hard task. In particular,
we show in Section 4 that it is impossible to design an age-based or backoff protocol that is
in equilibrium and has finite expected finishing time2. These impossibility results contribute
to a partial characterisation of such protocols and even hold for the case of two players. This
stands in contrast to the full-sensing case for which the authors in [9] give an equilibrium
protocol, where the k remaining players transmit with probability Θ
(
1√
k
)
. This protocol
finishes in finite but exponential time.
In Section 3, we introduce and analyze an equilibrium protocol for two players. An
interesting feature of our protocol is that each player is using only limited information of
her own history. More precisely, the probability of transmission in a time-slot, depends only
on whether a player attempted transmission in the previous slot. Our proof reduces the
POMDP for the best response policy to a finite MDP, which we then analyze. This reduction
crucially relies on the nature of our protocol. We further show that our equilibrium protocol
is the unique stationary equilibrium protocol.
For more than two players, we present an age-based equilibrium protocol. Although it has
infinite expected finishing time, every player finishes in linear time with high probability. Our
protocol circumvents the lack of information by maintaining an estimation on the number of
pending players, which with high probability is an upper bound on the actual number. The
protocol uses a deadline mechanism similar to [9]. Their protocol exploits the existence of
their finite time equilibrium protocol mentioned above. For our more restricted model it is
not known if such a finite time protocol exists for more than two players. This is the main
open question left from our work. We stress that our negative results exclude the possibility
that such a protocol can be age-based or backoff.
All missing proofs are included in a clearly marked Appendix.
1.2 Related Work
The ALOHA protocol, introduced by Abramson [1] (and modified by Roberts [25] to its
slotted version), is a multiple-access communication protocol, which has been around since the
70’s. Many subsequent papers study the efficiency of multiple-access protocols when packets
are generated by some stochastic process (see for example [12, 11, 24]), while worst-case
scenarios of bursty inputs, were studied in [5]. To model such a worst-case scenario, one
needs n nodes, each of which must simultaneously transmit a packet; this is also the model
we use in this work.
A large class of contention resolution protocols explicitly deals with conflict resolution;
where if k ≥ 2 users collide (out of a total of n users), then a resolution algorithm is called on
2 Note, that for more than two players, always transmitting is an equilibrium protocol with infinite
expected finishing time [9].
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to resolve this conflict (by ensuring that all the colliding packets are successfully transmitted),
before any other source is allowed to use the channel [7, 6, 15, 28]. There have been many
positive and negative results on the efficiency of protocols under various information models
(see [13] for an overview of results). When k is known, [10] provides an O(k + log k logn)
acknowledgment-based algorithm, while [18] provides a matching lower bound. For the ternary
model, [14] provides a bound of Ω(k(logn/ log k)) for all deterministic algorithms.
A variety of game theoretic models of slotted ALOHA have also been proposed and
studied; see for example [2, 17, 3]. However, much of this work only considers transmission
protocols that always transmit with the same fixed probability (perhaps as a function of
the number of players in the game). Other game theoretic approaches have considered
pricing schemes [29] and cases in which the channel quality changes with time and players
must choose their transmission levels accordingly [19, 30, 4]. [16] studied a game-thoretic
model that lies between the contention and congestion model, where the decision of when
to submit is part of the action space of the players. As discussed in the previous section,
the most relevant game-theoretic model to our work, is the one studied by Fiat, Mansour,
and Nadav [9] and by Christodoulou, Ligett, and Pyrga [8]. In [8], efficient -equilibrium
protocols are designed, but the authors assume non-zero transmission costs, in which case
the efficient protocol of [9] does not apply. Their protocols use multiplicity feedback (the
number of attempted transmissions) which again falls in the class of full-sensing protocols.
2 Model
Game Structure. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents, each one of which has a
single packet that he wants to send through a common channel. All players know n. We
assume time is discretized into slots t = 1, 2, . . .. The players that have not yet successfully
transmitted their packet are called pending and initially all n players are pending. At any
given time slot t, a pending player i has two available actions, either to transmit his packet
or to remain quiet. In a (mixed) strategy, a player i transmits his packet at time t with
some probability that potentially depends on information that i has gained from the channel
based on previous transmission attempts. If exactly one player transmits in a given slot t,
then his transmission is successful, the successful player exits the game (i.e. he is no longer
pending), and the game continues with the rest of the players. On the other hand, whenever
two or more agents try to access the channel (i.e. transmit) at the same slot, a collision
occurs and their transmissions fail, in which case the agents remain in the game. Therefore,
in case of collision or if the channel is idle (i.e. no player attempts to transmit) the set of
pending agents remains unchanged. The game continues until all players have successfully
transmitted their packets.
Transmission protocols. Let Xi,t be the indicator variable that indicates whether player i
attempted transmission at time t. For any t ≥ 1, we denote by ~Xt the transmission vector at
time t, i.e. ~Xt = (X1,t, X2,t, . . . , Xn,t). An acknowlegment-based protocol, uses very limited
channel feedback. After each time step t, only players that attempted a transmission receive
feedback, and the rest get no information. In fact, the information received by a player i
who transmitted during t is whether his transmission was successful (in which case he gets
an acknowledgement and exits the game) or whether there was a collision.
Let ~hi,t be the vector of the personal transmission history of player i up to time t, i.e.
~hi,t = (Xi,1, Xi,2, . . . , Xi,t). We also denote by ~ht the transmission history of all players up
to time t, i.e. ~ht = (~h1,t,~h2,t, . . . ,~hn,t). In an acknowledgement-based protocol, the actions
of player i at time t depend only (a) on his personal history ~hi,t−1 and (b) on whether he
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is pending or not at t. A decision rule fi,t for a pending player i at time t, is a function
that maps ~hi,t−1 to a probability Pr(Xi,t = 1|~hi,t−1). For a player i ∈ N , a (transmission)
protocol fi is a sequence of decision rules fi = {fi,t}t≥1 = fi,1, fi,2, · · · .
A transmission protocol is anonymous if and only if the decision rule assigns the same
transmission probability to all players with the same personal history. In particular, for any
two players i 6= j and any t ≥ 0, if ~hi,t−1 = ~hj,t−1, it holds that fi,t(~hi,t−1) = fj,t(~hj,t−1). In
this case, we drop the subscript i in the notation, i.e. we write f = f1 = · · · = fn.
We call a protocol fi for player i age-based if and only if, for any t ≥ 1, the transmission
probability Pr(Xi,t = 1|~hi,t−1) depends only (a) on time t and (b) on whether player
i is pending or not at t. In this case, we will denote the transmission probability by
pi,t
def= Pr(Xi,t = 1|~hi,t−1) = fi,t(~hi,t−1).
A protocol is called backoff if the decision rule at time t is a function of the number of
unsuccessful transmissions. We call a transmission protocol fi non-blocking if and only if, for
any t ≥ 1 and any transition history ~hi,t−1, the transmission probability Pr(Xi,t = 1|~hi,t−1)
is always smaller than 1. A protocol fi for player i is a deadline protocol with deadline
t0 ∈ {1, 2, . . .} if and only if fi,t(~hi,t−1) = 1, for any player i, any time slot t ≥ t0 and any
transmission history ~hi,t−1. A persistent player is one that uses the deadline protocol with
deadline 1.
Efficiency. Assume that all n players in the game employ an anonymous protocol f . We
will say that f is efficient if and only if all players will have successfully transmitted by time
Θ(n) with high probability (i.e. with probability tending to 1, as n goes to infinity).
Individual utility. Let ~f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) be such that player i uses protocol fi, i ∈ N .
For a given transmission sequence ~X1, ~X2, . . ., which is consistent with ~f , define the latency
or success time of agent i as Ti
def= inf{t : Xi,t = 1, Xj,t = 0, ∀j 6= i}. That is, Ti is the time
at which i successfully transmits. Given a transmission history ~ht, the n-tuple of protocols ~f
induces a probability distribution over sequences of further transmissions. In that case, we
write C ~fi (~ht)
def= E[Ti|~ht, ~f ] = E[Ti|~hi,t, ~f ] for the expected latency of agent i incurred by a
sequence of transmissions that starts with ~ht and then continues based on ~f . For anonymous
protocols, i.e. when f1 = f2 = · · · = fn = f , we will simply write Cfi (~ht) instead3.
Equilibria. The objective of every agent is to minimize her expected latency. We say that
~f = {f1, f2, . . . , fn} is in equilibrium if for any transmission history ~ht the agents cannot
decrease their expected latency by unilaterally deviating after t; that is, for all agents i, for
all time slots t, and for all decision rules f ′i for agent i, we have
C
~f
i (~ht) ≤ C(
~f−i,f ′i)
i (~ht),
where (~f−i, f ′i) denotes the protocol profile4 where every agent j 6= i uses protocol fj and
agent i uses protocol f ′i .
3 An equilibrium protocol for two players
In this section we show that there is an anonymous acknowledgment-based protocol in
equilibrium, when n = 2.
3 Abusing notation slightly, we will also write C ~fi (~h0) for the unconditional expected latency of player i
induced by ~f .
4 For an anonymous protocol f , we denote by (f−i, f ′i) the profile where agent j 6= i uses protocol f and
agent i uses protocol f ′i .
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We define the protocol f as follows: for any t ≥ 1, player i and transmission history
~hi,t−1,
fi,t(~hi,t−1) =
{ 2
3 , if Xi,t−1 = 1 or t = 1
1, if Xi,t−1 = 0.
(1)
I Theorem 1. There is an anonymous acknowledgment-based equilibrium protocol for two
players.
Proof. We will show that protocol f is in equilibrium. Let Alice and Bob be the two players
in the system. We will show that when Bob sticks with playing f , any deviation for Alice, at
any possible slot, will be less profitable for her.
Let’s denote by Cf,ji , for j ∈ {0, 1}, the expected success time for a pending player
i given that in the last round he attempted transmission (j = 1) or not (j = 0) i.e.,
Cf,ji = E[Ti|~ht, f,Xi,t = j]. The following claim asserts that the expected success time for
Alice depends only on whether she attempted a transmission or not in the previous slot. For
the proof, we compute the expected time to absorption for the Markov chainM shown in
Figure 1a, starting from states A and B. The full details can be found in Appendix A.
I Claim 1. Cf,jAlice = 2 + j, for j ∈ {0, 1}.
A B
C D
4
9
1
9
2
9
2
9
1
1
(a) Markov chain M.
A E
F D
2
3pA
1− pA
1
3pA
1
3pE
2
3pE
1− pE
1
(b) Markov chain M′.
Figure 1 Markov chains used in the analysis.
It remains to be shown that for any transmission history up to any time t, the optimal
(best-response) strategy for Alice is to follow f . Notice that this situation from Alice’s point
of view can be described by an infinite-horizon, undiscounted Partially observable Markov
Decision Process (POMDP), by the direct modification of the Markov chain M that is
described in the proof of Claim 1. This process is partially observable due to the uncertainty
created whenever Alice does not attempt transmission. This creates complications in the
analysis, as general results about the existence of optimal stationary policies in MDPs [23],
do not carry over immediately and also optimal policies are not always well-defined for
undiscounted POMDPs with infinite horizon [22]. Fortunately, by exploiting the nature of
our specific protocol f , and in particular the fact that a player using f never misses two
transmissions in a row, we are able to circumvent this difficulty and model the situation as
an MDP.
Following the notation in [21], the state space of the MDP is I = {A,E, F,D}. The states
are interpreted as follows: As in the Markov chainM, state A describes the situation in which
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both players are pending and they both know it (this is reached just after a collision, or at
time t = 1) and state D corresponds to the state in which Alice successfully transmitted. F is
the state in which Alice did not transmit for two consecutive rounds. Since Bob follows f , he
will have transmitted in one of these two rounds. Thus, in F Alice is the only pending player
and she knows it. Note that in F the unique optimal strategy for Alice is to transmit in the
next round. Finally, E is the state in which Alice is uncertain whether she is the only pending
player in the system; this happens at t if she did not transmit at t− 1, but transmitted at
t− 2 and there was a collision. State E essentially corresponds to a combination of states B
and C in Figure 1a.
Since Alice clearly starts at state A, the initial distribution of the MDP is λ, where
λA = 1 and λE = λF = λD = 0. The set of actions for Alice is A = [0, 1]. In particular,
if Alice decides to take action a ∈ A at time t, then she will transmit with probability a
at t. Furthermore, the cost function of the MDP is c(a) = (cs(a) : s ∈ I) and we have
cA(a) = cE(a) = cF (a) = 1 and cD(a) = 0 for all a ∈ A. Finally, for the transition matrix of
our MDP, notice that, since the MDP describes the situation from Alice’s perspective, we
calculate transition probabilities by “deferring” the relevant decisions taken by Bob until the
time that Alice gets feedback. The transition matrix of our MDP is shown in equation (2)
and it is explained in more detailed below.
P (a) =

2a
3 1− a 0 a3
a
3 0 1− a 2a3
0 0 1− a a
0 0 0 1
 . (2)
In particular, we can see from (2) that the probability to visit state A in one step, given that
we are at state E and the action taken is a ∈ [0, 1], is PE,A(a) = a3 . Indeed, this happens at
some time t if at time t− 1 Alice did not transmit but Bob did not transmit either; therefore,
by definition of f , given that we are at E (i.e. Alice did not transmit at time t − 1), the
probability that we reach A is equal to the probability that Alice transmits at t (which
happens with probability a) multiplied by the probability that Bob did not transmit at t− 1
(which happens with probability 13 ). Similarly, the probability that we visit D in one step,
given that we are at state E and the action taken is a ∈ [0, 1], is PE,D(a) = 2a3 , which is the
probability that Alice transmits in the current step and Bob transmitted in the previous one
(in which Alice did not transmit, thus Bob was successful).
By Lemma 5.4.2 and Theorem 5.4.3 from [21], there is a stationary policy (i.e. protocol)
u∗ that is optimal in the sense that it achieves the minimum expected total cost, given that
we start at state A. The fact that u∗ is stationary significantly reduces the search space
of optimal strategies. In particular, this allows us to only consider strategies for which the
actions taken by Alice (in the above MDP) depend only on the current state. In fact, we
can further reduce the family of optimal strategies considered by noting that in any optimal
strategy Alice will transmit with probability 1 when in state F ; indeed, when Alice knows
that she is the only pending player, she will decide to transmit with probability 1 in the next
time step. Therefore, it only remains to determine the probability of transmission when we
are at either state A of E; denote those by pA and pE respectively. Therefore, this leads to a
Markov chainM′ with state space I ′ = I and transition probabilities that correspond to
actions from the above MDP. The transition graph ofM′ is shown in Figure 1b.
Clearly, the expected latency of Alice when she uses protocol u∗ and Bob uses protocol
f is equal to the expected hitting time k′DA thatM′ needs to reach state D, given that we
start from A. By definition, we have k′DF = 1, k
′D
D = 0, and by the Markov property, we get
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k
′D
A = 1 + 23pAk
′D
A + (1 − pA)k
′D
E and k
′D
E = 1 + 13pEk
′D
A + (1 − pE)k
′D
F . Rearranging and
after substitutions we get k′DA = 3 and k
′D
E = 2, for any pA, pE ∈ [0, 1]. Comparing this to
Claim 1, we conclude that if Bob uses f , a best response for Alice is to also follow f . This
completes the proof of the Theorem. J
3.1 Uniqueness
We will say that a protocol is stationary if the decision rule for each player at some time
t depends on the information state of the player at t. In particular, the protocol defined
in equation (1) is stationary. In this section we show that there are no other stationary
equilibria.
I Theorem 2. For two players, the unique stationary anonymous protocol that is in equilib-
rium is the one defined in equation (1).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is another stationary protocol that
is in equilibrium. As in the analysis of protocol (1) in Section 3, we denote by A the state
where both players know they are both pending. Let Alice be one of the two players. Notice
that, every time Alice transmits, either there is a collision (in which case Alice returns to
state A) or the transmission is successful (so Alice is no longer pending).
For k = 1, 2, . . . , let pk denote the probability that Alice transmits in step k, given that
she starts from A at t = 0 and she does not transmit in time steps 1 to k − 1. Therefore,
given that we start from A at time 0, the probability that Alice attempts to transmit for the
first time after k steps is pk
∏k−1
k′=1(1− pk′). In particular, in the equilibrium described in
the previous section, we had p1 = 23 and p2 = 1.
First, assume there is another stationary protocol g that is in equilibrium, for which
p2 = 1 and p1 = p 6= 23 . Adjusting the transition probabilities in the Markov chain in Figure
1a accordingly, and doing the same analysis we can derive that the expected latency of Alice
when both players use protocol g is kDA =
2−p
2p(1−p) . We will show that for all p 6= 23 a player
has a profitable deviation. Indeed, first observe that p > 23 implies kDA > 3. In this case
Alice can improve her expected latency by not transmitting for two consecutive time steps
and then (successfully) transmitting in the third time step. Second, for the case that p < 23 ,
persistently transmitting in each time step is a deviation which gives the deviator an expected
latency of 11−p . For p <
2
3 this is strictly less than the expected latency kDA =
2−p
2p(1−p) that
Alice has when both players use protocol g. From both cases, we conclude that there is no
stationary protocol in equilibrium for which p2 = 1 and p1 6= 23 .
Now assume that there is another stationary protocol z in equilibrium, for which p2 < 1.
Denote αz the expected latency of Alice when both players use protocol z. Similarly denote
α(z′) the expected latency of Alice when she unilaterally deviates from z to some other
protocol z′. We will consider the following three protocols that Alice can use instead of z: (i)
Using protocol (1z), Alice will transmit in the first time step and then continue by following
protocol z. (ii) Using protocol (01z), Alice will not transmit in the first time step, but will
transmit in the second time step and then follow the protocol z. (iii) Finally, using protocol
(001z), Alice will not transmit for the first two time steps, but will transmit in the third time
step and then follow the protocol z. The expected latency of Alice when she uses each of
those protocols while the other player uses z is given by:
α(1z) = 1 + p1αz
α(01z) = 2 + (1− p1)p2αz
α(001z) = 3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)p3αz.
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Notice now that all three transmission sequences (1), (0, 1) and (0, 0, 1) are consistent with z.
Furthermore, z is acknowledgment-based, so Lemma 3 applies here. Therefore, the above
expected latencies must all be equal to αz. Using the identities αz = α(1z) = α(01z) we get
that αz = 2 + p2 < 3. But clearly 3 ≤ α(001z), which is a contradiction to the fact that
αz = α(001z). Thus, there is no equilibrium protocol with p2 < 1. This completes the proof
of the theorem. J
4 Age-based and backoff protocols
In this section, we focus on two special prominent classes of acknowledgment-based protocols,
namely age-based and backoff, and we show that these cannot be implemented in equilibrium
if we insist on finite expected latency.
In what follows, for any protocol f , any player i that uses f and any time t, we will say
that ~hi,t is consistent with f if and only if there is a non-zero probability that ~hi,t will occur
for player i.
Now we are ready to show in the next Lemma a useful property of all acknowledgment-
based equilibrium protocols that is essentially an analogue of the property of Nash equilibria
for finite games that all pure strategies in the support of a Nash equilibrium are best
responses.
I Lemma 3. Let f def= {ft}t≥1 be an anonymous acknowledgment-based protocol and let
pi
def= pi1, pi2, . . . be any 0-1 sequence which is consistent with f . For any (finite) positive
integer τ∗, define the protocol
g = g(τ∗) def=
{
pit, for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗
ft, for t > τ∗.
(3)
We then have that, for any fixed player i, if f is in equilibrium, then
Cfi (~h0) = C
(f−i,g)
i (~h0).
Proof. Since we consider acknowledgment-based protocols, for the sake of the analysis, we
will assume that players continue to flip coins even after successfully transmitting, so that
they eventually find out what their decisions would have been at any time t.5
For a fixed player i, we obtain
Cfi (~h0) = E[Ti|~hi,0, f ] =
∑
~hi,τ∗
E[Ti|~hi,τ∗ , f ] Pr
{
~hi,τ∗ happens for i
}
. (4)
Notice now that, since f is acknowledgment-based, the event
{
~hi,τ∗ happens for i
}
is in-
dependent of the transmission sequences of other players. Therefore, E[Ti|~hi,τ∗ , f ] is equal
to the unconditional (i.e. conditioned on ~hi,0) expected latency of player i when she
uses the protocol defined in equation (3), where the first τ∗ terms of pi are replaced by
(pi1, . . . , piτ∗) = ( ~Xi,1, . . . , ~Xi,τ∗) = ~hi,τ∗ .6 In particular, we have that E[Ti|~hi,τ∗ , f ] =
E[Ti|~hi,0, (f−i, g)] = C(f−i,g)i (~h0).
5 In fact, we only need this assumption to hold for any t which is at most some predefined fixed upper
bound τ∗.
6 Note that this observation is not true for general protocols and different kinds of feedback, which is why
the present analysis cannot be used to prove an impossibility result in the case of protocols like those in
[9].
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Assume now for the sake of contradiction that there is a transmission history ~hi,τ∗ for
player i such that E[Ti|~hi,τ∗ , f ] 6= E[Ti|~hi,0, f ]. Clearly, if E[Ti|~hi,τ∗ , f ] < E[Ti|~hi,0, f ], then
the protocol g is a better protocol for player i, which contradicts the fact that f is in
equilibrium. On the other hand, if E[Ti|~hi,τ∗ , f ] > E[Ti|~hi,0, f ], then equation (4) implies
that there must be another transmission history ~h′i,τ∗ for which E[Ti|~h′i,τ∗ , f ] < E[Ti|~hi,0, f ].
Therefore, we have that C(f−i,g)i (~h0) = E[Ti|~hi,0, (f−i, g)] = E[Ti|~hi,τ∗ , f ] = E[Ti|~hi,0, f ] =
Cfi (~h0), for any transmission history ~hi,τ∗ , and for any finite τ∗ ≥ 1, thus also for any 0-1
sequence pi that is consistent with f . J
The next corollary is an interesting consequence of Lemma 3 regarding non-blocking
anonymous age-based protocols.The full proof can be found in Appendix B.
I Corollary 4. Let f def= {ft}t≥1 be a non-blocking anonymous age-based protocol. If the
expected latency of a player using protocol f is finite, i.e. E[Ti|~hi,0, f ] <∞, then f is not in
equilibrium.
We are now ready to show the main result of this section.
I Theorem 5. There is no anonymous age-based protocol f for n ≥ 2 players that is in
equilibrium and has E[Ti|~hi,0, f ] <∞, for any player i.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let’s assume that f = {ft}t≥1 is an age-based protocol
in equilibrium with finite expected latency, i.e. E[Ti|~h0, f ] <∞. The next claim asserts the
existence of a finite positive integer τ∗ where the protocol dictates transmission, with certain
properties, which will be a useful ingredient for the rest of the proof. The detailed proof of
Claim 2 can be found in Appendix C.
I Claim 2. Let f be an anonymous age-based protocol for n players that is in equilibrium
and has E[Ti|~hi,0, f ] <∞, then there is a finite positive integer τ∗ such that
(a) fτ∗ = 1,
(b) fτ∗−1 < 1 and
(c) there exist τ1 < · · · < τn−1 < τ∗, such that fτj < 1, for all j = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Take a τ∗ as described in the above claim and consider the protocol Q defined as follows
Q
def=

0, if ft < 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗ − 2
1, if ft = 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗ − 2
1, for t = τ∗ − 1 and t = τ∗
ft, for t > τ∗.
(5)
Notice that, since the initial (deterministic) sequence of transmissions of Q is consistent with
f , by Lemma 3 we have that E[Ti|~hi,0, f ] = E[Ti|~hi,0, (f−i, Q)].
Now consider the protocol Q′, which is the same as Q, with the only difference7 that
Q′τ∗ = 0. In fact, we show that, E[Ti|~hi,0, (f−i, Q′)] < E[Ti|~hi,0, (f−i, Q)] which implies
E[Ti|~hi,0, (f−i, Q′)] < E[Ti|~hi,0, f ], which contradicts the assumption that f is in equilibrium.
Notice now that protocols Q and Q′ are identical for any t 6= τ∗, and if there are at least
3 pending players at τ∗ (i.e. Alice and at least two others), then there would be a collision at
τ∗ no matter which of the two protocols Alice uses (i.e. the same players that were pending
at τ∗ would be pending at the start of time slot τ∗ + 1 as well). Therefore, the two protocols
7 Note that Q′ does not agree with f whenever ft = 1, so Lemma 3 does not apply to Q′.
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behave the same in this case. However, if there are exactly 2 pending players at τ∗ (i.e.
Alice and exactly one more, say Bob) the two protocols behave differently. Indeed, if Alice
uses protocol Q, then there will be a collision at τ∗, leaving exactly 2 pending players at
τ∗ + 1. However, if Alice uses protocol Q′, then Bob will be able to successfully transmit
at τ∗, leaving Alice the only pending player at time τ∗ + 1, which implies a strictly smaller
expected latency. The proof is completed by noting that, by definition of τ∗, the probability
that there will be exactly 2 players pending at τ∗ is strictly positive (since there are at least
n− 2 steps before τ∗ − 1 with transmission probability strictly less than 1). J
Now we conclude with the impossibility result for backoff protocols, the proof of which
shares similarities to the proof of Corollary 4.
I Theorem 6. There is no anonymous backoff protocol f in equilibrium for n ≥ 2 players
with E[Ti|~hi,0, f ] <∞, for any player i.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that f is in equilibrium and let τ∗ def=
⌊
E[Ti|~hi,0, f ]
⌋
be finite, where i is a fixed player using f . By definition, we have that fi = {pi,k}k≥0, where
pi,k denotes the transmission probability of player i after k unsuccessful transmissions. Notice
also that we may assume without loss of generality that pi,0 6= 1. Indeed, suppose there is
finite integer s > 0, such that pi,k′ = 1, for all k′ < s and pi,s 6= 1 (if s is not finite, then
clearly f does not have finite expected latency). Then the protocol f ′ = {p′i,k}k≥0, with
p′i,k = pi,k+s, for all k ≥ 0 is also an equilibrium.
Consider now the protocol g = g(τ∗) defined in equation (3), where the first τ∗ terms
of pi are set to 0. Clearly, any player using g has expected latency at least τ∗ + 1. Notice
also that pi is consistent with f up to τ∗, since Pr{~hi,τ∗ = (0, . . . , 0)|f} = (1− pi,0)τ∗ > 0.
Therefore, by Lemma 3 we have that τ∗ + 1 > E[Ti|~hi,0, f ] = E[Ti|~hi,0, (f−i, g)] ≥ τ∗ + 1,
which is a contradiction. But this implies that, either f is not in equilibrium, or τ∗ is ∞. J
5 An efficient protocol in equilibrium
In this section we present a deadline protocol for n players that is efficient, i.e. with high
probability the latency of any player is Θ(n). Let t0 = t0(n) be an integer, to be determined
later and let β ∈ (0, 1) be a fixed constant. We consider the following deadline protocol Q
with deadline t0, which is defined as follows: The t0 − 1 time steps before the deadline are
partitioned into k + 1 consecutive intervals I1, I2, . . . , Ik+1, where k = k(n) is the unique
integer satisfying βk+1n ≤ √n < βkn. For any j ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}, define nj = βjn. For
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} the length of interval Ij is `j =
⌊
e
βnj
⌋
. Interval Ik+1 is special and has length
`k+1 = n. In particular, this gives
t0
def= 1 +
k+1∑
j=1
`j ≤ 1 + n+ en
k∑
j=1
βj−1 = 1 + n+ en1− β
k−1
1− β ≤ n
(
1 + e1− β
)
,
where the last inequality holds for any constant β ∈ (0, 1) and n→∞. For any t ≥ 1, the
decision rule at time t for protocol Q is given by
Qt =
{
1
nj
, if t ∈ Ij , j = 1, 2, . . . , k + 1
1, if t ≥ t0.
(6)
Notice that, by definition, Q is an age-based protocol. Furthermore, if at least two out of
n players use protocol Q, then, no matter what protocol the rest of the players use, there is
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a non-zero probability that there will be no successful transmission until the deadline t0, and
thus all players will remain pending for ever. In particular, this is at least the probability
that the two players using Q attempt a transmission in every step until t0, which happens
with probability
∏t0−1
t=1 (Qt)2 ≥ 1nt0 > 0. Therefore, if there are at least two players using
Q, the expected latency of any player is ∞, hence Q is in equilibrium, for any n ≥ 3 and
deadline t0.
In Theorem 9 we prove that Q is also efficient; when all players in the system use protocol
Q, then with high probability all players will successfully transmit before the deadline t0.
For the proof, we use two elementary Lemmas that formalize the fact that, in each interval,
a significant number of players successfully transmit with high probability. For the proofs,
we employ standard concentration results from probability theory. Full details can be found
in Appendix D and E.
I Lemma 7. Assume that all players in the system use protocol Q. For any j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if
the number of pending players before interval Ij is at most nj , then after Ij , with probability
at least 1− exp(− 13βj+2n) there will be at most nj+1 pending players.
I Lemma 8. If the number of pending players at the start of interval Ik+1 is at most nk+1,
then after interval Ik+1, with probability at least 1 − exp
(− 13nk+1) all players will have
successfully transmitted.
We are now ready to prove our main Theorem.
I Theorem 9. Protocol Q is efficient. In particular, for any constant β ∈ (0, 1), when all
players use Q, the probability that there is a pending player after time t0 ≤ n
(
1 + e1−β
)
is
at most exp(−Θ(√n)).
Proof. It suffices to show that with high probability every player will have successfully
transmitted before t0. Note that, the probability that there are still pending players at
t0 = Θ(n) is upper bounded by the probability that (a) there exists j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} such
that, at the end of interval Ij there are more than nj+1 pending players, or (b) there are
still pending players after interval Ik+1.
Therefore, by Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 and the union bound, the probability that not all
players successfully transmit before t0 is at most
exp
(
−13nk+1
)
+
k∑
j=1
exp
(
−13β
2nj
)
. (7)
Since nj ≥ nk+1 ≥ β
√
n, for any j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, the above upper bound becomes (k +
1) exp (−Θ(√n)). The proof is concluded by noting that, by definition of k, we have
k = Θ(logn). J
We note that, in our analysis, β ∈ (0, 1) can be any constant arbitrarily close to 0,
therefore, by Theorem 9, the upper bound on the latency of protocol Q can be as small as
(1 + e)n+ o(n) with high probability.
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A Proof of Claim 1
The situation from Alice’s perspective can be modeled as a Markov chain M with state
space {A,B,C,D}. A is the initial state where both players are pending (and they both
know this). A is reached either in t = 1, or when Alice transmitted in the previous time
step and there was a collision. State B models the case when both players are pending, but
Alice does not know this, because she did not transmit in the previous time step. State C is
reached when only Alice is pending; notice that, by definition of the protocol, there is no
way for Alice to distinguish with certainty between states B and C if both herself and Bob
use f . Finally, D is the state in which Alice has successfully transmitted. The transition
graph ofM is shown in Figure 1a.
For example, we can see from the transition graph that the probability that we visit state
A at time t+ 1, given that we are in B at t is given by Pr(Mt+1 = A|Mt = B) = 1. Indeed,
ifMt = B, neither player transmitted at t, so both will transmit with probability 1 at t+ 1,
causing a collision, after which Alice (and also Bob) can deduce that all players are still
pending. Similarly, Pr(Mt+1 = D|Mt = C) = 1, because, being at C means that only Bob
transmitted (successfully) at t and so Alice will transmit (also successfully, being the only
pending player) at t+ 1 with probability 1.
Clearly, Cf,1Alice is equal to the expected hitting time kDA thatM needs to reach state D,
given that we start from A. By definition, we have kDC = 1, kDD = 0, and by the Markov
property, we get kDB = kDA + 1 and kDA = 1 + 49kDA +
1
9k
D
B + 29kDC +
2
9k
D
D . By rearranging terms
and making the substitutions, we conclude that Cf,1Alice = 3.
Calculating Cf,0Alice is a bit more tricky, because since Alice did not attempt transmission
at the previous slot, she cannot be certain in which state she is, but she knows that is at
state B with probability 1/3 and in C with 2/3. Therefore Cf,0Alice = 13kDB +
2
3k
D
C = 2. J
B Proof of Corollary 4
Assume for the sake of contradiction that f is in equilibrium and let τ∗ def=
⌊
E[Ti|~hi,0, f ]
⌋
be
finite, where i is a fixed player using f . Consider the protocol g = g(τ∗) as defined in (3),
where the first τ∗ terms of pi are set equal to 0. Clearly, any player using g has expected
latency at least τ∗ + 1, irrespectively of the transmissions of the other players. Notice also
that pi is consistent with f up to τ∗, since Pr{~hi,τ∗ = (0, . . . , 0)|f} =
∏τ∗
t=1(1 − pi,t) > 0.
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Therefore, by Lemma 3 we have that τ∗ + 1 > E[Ti|~hi,0, f ] = E[Ti|~hi,0, (f−i, g)] ≥ τ∗ + 1,
which is a contradiction. We conclude that either f is not in equilibrium, or τ∗ is ∞. J
C Proof of Claim 2
For any time t, define Zft to be the number of non-blocking probabilities of the protocol
f up to t, i.e. Zft
def=
∑
t′≤t(1 − bft′c). Set τ ′
def= inf{t : ft = 1, Zft ≥ n − 1}. Assume for
the sake of contradiction that there does not exist a τ∗ with the properties described in the
claim. In particular, this means that τ ′ =∞. However, the latter can happen if one of the
following cases is true:
(i) There is no finite τ such that fτ = 1.
(ii) There exists finite τ such that fτ = 1, Zft ≤ n− 2 and ft = 1, for all t ≥ τ .
(iii) There exists finite τ such that fτ = 1, Zft ≤ n− 2 and ft < 1, for all t ≥ τ .
We now prove that in all those cases we get a contradiction. Case (i) comes in contradiction
with Corollary 4.
If case (ii) holds, then clearly, if all players use f , at most n− 2 players can successfully
transmit before τ and the rest will remain pending for ever. But this means that the expected
latency of a player i using f is at least
Pr{i does not successfully transmit before τ |~hi,0, f} · ∞ =∞,
which leads to a contradiction, since we assumed E[Ti|~hi,0, f ] <∞.
Suppose now that case (iii) holds. Consider the protocol g defined as follows:
g
def=

0, if ft < 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ E[Ti|~hi,0, f ]
1, if ft = 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ E[Ti|~hi,0, f ]
ft, for t > E[Ti|~hi,0, f ].
(8)
Let i be a fixed player (say Alice). Notice that, if all other players use f and Alice uses g, then
Alice has expected latency strictly larger than E[Ti|~hi,0, f ]; indeed, for any t ≤ E[Ti|~hi,0, f ],
Alice only attempts a transmission when ft = 1 and there is at least one more other
pending player using f , and so there is a collision. However, since the initial (deterministic)
sequence of
⌊
E[Ti|~hi,0, f ]
⌋
transmissions of g is consistent with f , by Lemma 3 we have that
E[Ti|~hi,0, f ] = E[Ti|~hi,0, (f−i, g)] > E[Ti|~hi,0, f ], which is a contradiction. This completes the
proof of the claim. J
D Proof of Lemma 7
Fix j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and assume that the precondition of the lemma is fulfilled, i.e., before
interval Ij there are at most nj pending players. Let rt denote the number of pending players
at time t. In particular, for any t ∈ Ij , if the preconditions of the lemma is fulfilled, we have
rt ≤ nj . Therefore the probability of a successful transmission in round t ∈ Ij is given by
rtQt(1−Qt)rt−1 ≥ rtQt(1−Qt)nj−1 = rt 1
nj
(
1− 1
nj
)nj−1
≥ 1
e
rt
nj
,
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where in the last inequality we used the fact that
(
1− 1x
)x−1 ≥ 1e , for any x > 1. Therefore,
for any round t ∈ Ij , either we already have rt ≤ nj+1 = βnj pending players, or the
probability of a successful transmission in round t is at least a def= 1e
nj+1
nj
= βe .
Let now Xj be the random variable counting the number of successful transmissions in
interval Ij . Notice that, by the above discussion, given that at the start of interval Ij there
are at least nj+1 pending players, Xj stochastically dominates a Binomial random variable
Yj ∼ Bin(`j , a), with mean value `j · a. Therefore, by a Chernoff bound (see [26]), we get
Pr(Xj < (1− β)`j · a) ≤ Pr(Yj < (1− β)`j · a) ≤ exp
(
−12β
2`j · a
)
≤ exp
(
−13β
2nj
)
,
where in the last inequality we used the fact that, by definition, nj ≥
√
n, for all j ≤ k, thus
`j · βe ≥ 23nj . This directly implies the lemma. J
E Proof of Lemma 8
Consider a fixed player (say Alice) that is pending at the start of interval Ik+1. Given that
there are at most nk+1 = βk+1n pending players at any time step t ∈ Ik+1, the probability
that Alice successfully transmits during t is at least
Qt(1−Qt)nk+1−1 = 1
nk+1
(
1− 1
nk+1
)nk+1−1
.
Therefore, since |Ik+1| = `k+1 = n, the probability that Alice is still pending after interval
Ik+1 is at most
(
1− 1
nk+1
(
1− 1
nk+1
)nk+1−1)n
≤ exp
(
− n
nk+1
(
1− 1
nk+1
)nk+1−1)
. (9)
Recall that, by definition, k is the (unique) smallest integer satisfying nk+1 ≤
√
n < nk. In
particular, this implies that nk+1 > β
√
n, therefore nk+1 goes to ∞ as n→∞. Additionally,
we have that nnk+1 ≥ nk+1. Therefore, using the fact that
(
1− 1x
)x−1 ≥ 1e , for any x > 1,
the right hand side of (9) is at most exp
(− 1enk+1).
By the union bound, given that there are at most nk+1 pending players at the start of
interval Ik+1, the probability that there is at least one pending player after Ik+1 is at most
nk+1 exp
(− 1enk+1) ≤ exp (− 13nk+1), as stated in the Lemma. J
